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Abstract 
This paper briefly discusses usage of the following terms with respect to wages in New Zealand: fair, living, family, 
minimum and social wages. A historical outline is followed by consideratif}n of some arguments used by various 
interest groups, particularly with respect to changes to the minimum wage in recent years. Noting international trends 
towards increasing earnings differentials, it discusses why a living wage is less central to New Zealand wage 
campaigns than in the United States. It argues that social justice advocates will and should continue to work on a 
combination of employer responsibility and government support for those on low wages - with a realistic minimum 
wage part of a package which could also include the concept of a living wage, explicitly or at least implicitly. 
Introduction 
Living wage ordinances covering businesses contracting 
with local government had been passed by over sixty 
municipalities in the United States by the end of 2001. 
Most were at levels of US$8.50 to $10.50 per hour as 
against the federal minimum wage ofUS$5.15. Although 
only a very small proportion of the labour force are 
directly covered, some ripple effects occur and the living 
wage movement draws attention to the fact that minimum 
wage employment leaves many families in poverty. New 
Zealand's industrial relations and social welfare systems 
contain elements not present in the United States that are 
intended to alleviate family poverty particularly for single 
income families with total earnings at or close to the 
minimum wage. Nevertheless, it bears investigation why 
the concept of a living wage, formerly prevalent in New 
Zealand discourse, is no longer a common slogan. 
This paper therefore summarises briefly some older and 
current usages of the terms fair, living, family and social 
wage in New Zealand, as well as paying more detailed 
attention to arguments over the minimum wage and 
discussing gender aspects of living and minimum wages. 
It argues that in a period when labour market differentials 
have widened substantially and real incomes at or below 
the average have been stagnant or falling, it is important 
for social justice advocates to work on a combination of 
employer responsibility and government support for those 
on low wages. A realistic minimum wage is a vital part of 
the latter approach, while the living wage concept could 
perhaps be part of a broad strategy. 
Historical Background to 194~ 
The 1894 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
framework, together with shortages of labour between 
1894 and 1908, "placed the trade unions in a position of 
which they took full advantage" (Woods, 1963, p 49). 
Unions obtained wage increases from individual 
employers and then applied to the conciliation and 
arbitration machinery for more general application of the 
increases in awards for the relevant type of work. In this 
period, the principles used by the Arbitration Court were 
largely those of fixing a 'fair wage', by which was meant 
"what reasonably good employers were actually paying 
for a particular class of labour" (ibid, p 95). Thus 
different minima were set in different awards on this fair 
wage basis. In 1907, however, the Harvester Award in 
Victoria, Australia, promulgated the principle of a wage 
designed to guarantee a (MALE) worker a certain 
standard of living, the beginnings of the 'family wage' or 
'living wage', which appear to be virtually equivalent 
terms for some time at least in Australasia. This decision 
clearly had an impact on the New Zealand Arbitration 
Court even though it said little about a living wage policy 
before 1914. However, by 1908 it had adopted a rate of 
8s a day as a basic rate for unskilled male labour under 
fair wage arguments. 
Such a general basic rate inevitably led to attempts to 
increase it according to price changes, thus starting to 
elide fair wage and living wage concepts, even though 
they were potentially contradictory. During the First 
World War, the Court followed price movements more 
directly "on the grounds explicitly stated that it was 
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concerned particularly with the preservation of a 
reasonable living standard ... In 1918 the Court went so 
far as to state that an industry which could not afford a 
reasonable living wage should cease operations" (ibid, p 
97), an argument still used by those seeking to increase 
the minimum wage. In 1920 amending legislation 
included the requirement that awards should provide for a 
'fair living wage', thus completing the mixing of these 
concepts. By 1922, "it was preponderantly concerned 
with maintaining a minimum purchasing power for 
industrial workers" (ibid, p 1 03), although it should be 
noted that not all workers were covered by the Court's 
decisions. Noel Woods sums up the changes in the 
Court's functions generally as a shift "from mediation to 
protection" (ibid, p 139), with the cost of living a major 
pillar of its fixing of the general minimum or basic 
unskilled rate. By the mid 1920s the growth of the 
political Labour movement and party gave momentum to 
a trade union campaign for increases beyond the cost of 
living in basic wage rates. 
In 1925 the Court was asked by Government to make a 
statement on its wage fixing principles in response to the 
criticism. The living wage part of their response stated 
more explicitly than ever before the view that their 
minimum (MALE) rate should be sufficient to maintain a 
man, his wife and two dependent children, refuting a 
suggestion that it should cover three children since two 
was close to the average. While a sound statistical basis 
of family budgetting for assessing the minimum amount 
needed was lacking, the principle was clear. With Labour 
in government for the first time in 1935, legislation was 
passed requiring the Arbitration Court to make a general 
order in 1936 fixing a basic minimum wage rate for adult 
males and (a lower) one for adult females to apply to 
every award 'and agreement under its jurisiction. The 
male rate was to be sufficient to maintain him, his wife 
and three (not two) dependent children, apparently based 
on the argument of encouraging larger families which 
would be good for the country. Wartime provisions then 
intervened and the first legislation on a Minimum Wage 
covering ALL employees was enacted in 1945. 
Despite their earlier commitment to equal pay, Labour in 
government in the period just discussed did not question 
the gender biases implicit in the family wage concept 
which allowed higher wages for men, irrespective of 
whether individual men or women actually had 
dependents. The 1936 decision had set the female level at 
only 47% of the male rate, increasing to 66% in 1947, 
with the differential not abolished until the full 
implementation of the 1972 Equal Pay Act. Clearly 
attaching the same meaning to family wage and living 
wage is compatible with a significant gender bias in each. 
In 1950 the Court argued that the family wage aspects of 
the 1936 legislation had been made 'more or less 
obsolete' by the setting of the overall minimum wage by 
government under the 1945 Act and by the system of 
family allowances, first introduced as a small (2s per 
week for third and subsequent children) tightly income 
tested benefit in 1926 and made universal in 1946. The 
allowances gave some women an income in their hands 
for the first time. Further, by conceding that the male 
breadwinner wage could not support all families, the 
allowances started to delink men's wages from 
responsibility for dependents, thus setting the scene for 
arguments for equal pay for women in paid work (Nolan, 
2000). 
The first Labour government also developed the 
framework of a welfare state for both those in paid work 
and the unemployed. They combined aspects of universal 
and targetted provisions, including free health care and 
education, provision of state housing, and unemployment 
benefits (Du Plessis 1995). The New Zealand and 
Australian combination of labour market and welfare 
provisions have frequently been characterised as a (male) 
wage earners' welfare state and the value of the 
provisions noted by their inclusion in the term 'social 
wage'. "Adding to wages-as-income the various services 
provided by the government we have the 'social wage"' 
(Easton, 1986, p 81). 
Thus the social wage could be seen as a full income 
concept, including all non wage benefits paid for by 
employers, and contributions from government revenue 
to wage earners or the whole population. These could be 
income targetted or otherwise, paid in the form of income 
supplements, general or targetted, or could be paid 
through vouchers or subsidies geared specifically to food, 
housing, health, superannuation or education. Not all of 
these alternatives have been used in New Zealand, where 
the voucher system has been strongly resisted. Using the 
social wage concept, explicit trade offs have been 
bargained in Australia between the government and union 
movement under a long running Accord, with other 
benefits, such as improvements in subsidised work based 
superannuation, substituted for general wage increases. 
No such formal system for tradeoffs was instituted in 
New Zealand despite some moves towards a Compact by 
the Moore Labour government in 1990 and recent 
interesting hints about a social dialogue. However, 
governments have certainly used improvements in other 
areas as a justification for lower wage increases than 
unions ~ought. 
The Last 55 Years: The Minimum Wage and 
Minimum Code 
The New Zealand adult minimum wage provided from 
Aprill946 a minimum weekly rate for men of$10.50 and 
for women of $6.30 (60%), with a gender differential 
continued until the mid 1970s. The rate is not 
automatically raised each year, although it must be 
reviewed annually. Of the 29 OECD countries, 17 had 
national minimum wages in 1998 (this has since 
increased, with a minimum wage established in the UK) 
and 12 of these had some form of indexation. Price 
indexation and relativity to average wages have often 
been suggested in New Zealand, but never adopted. 
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However, the relativity of the minimum wage to average 
wages has fluctuated wildly over the years with extremes 
of 30% in 1984 and 83% in 1947 (see table 1). The 
proportionality never fell below two thirds before 1957, 
gradually fell to 44% in 1972 and was restored to almost 
two thirds in 1973 in line with a recommendation of the 
1972 Royal Commission on Social Security. Adjustments 
in the next 11 years were few and well below price and 
general wage increases in a period of high inflation, so 
that the ratio had fallen to 30% in 1984 after nine years of 
National government. The minimum was raised in three 
steps between 1985 and 1987 to reach 52.5% under 
Labour. 
Further slippage under National from 1990 to 1999 and 
only partial restoration by Labour/ Alliance has led to the 
current fairly low relativity of 42%. The most recent 
increase took the level from February 2002 to $8 per 
hour, up 30 cents, while youth rates for 16/17 year olds 
rose by $1 to $6.40, to move them up to 80% of the adult 
rate - thanks to trade union pressure and a major 
campaign by the junior Alliance government partner. 
With regard to the level of the minimum wage, there is 
"nothing at all rational about the level it sits at" (Harre, 
2002, p 4). This from the then Alliance Associate 
Minister of Labour and Minister of Women's Affairs, 
Leila Harre, who added: "Why 42% of the average? Why 
not 50% or the European goal of 66%? (ibid). In 1998, 
when the relativity was 43.7%, the New Zealand 
minimum wage was, according to the CTU submission, 
8th highest in US$ or purchasing power parity of the 17 
OECD countries with minima, with largely the lower 
income countries lower ranked. New Zealand was 
similarly around the middle on relativity to average total 
earnings for full time workers, at 6th of the 13 countries 
with data available. 
Two economists and strong advocates of a high minimum 
wage have called for a ratio as high as 80% (Brosnan and 
Wilkinson, 1987), back to the level in the earliest years of 
a legislated minimum. Brosnan and Wilkinson argue on 
equity and efficiency grounds for an effective minimum 
wage, citing the need for incentives to train and retain 
staff and raise productivity. They also refreshingly 
mention the unfashionable argument for the positive 
multiplier effect of higher wages and reject the orthodox 
account of low pay simply reflecting low skill, "an 
argument of impregnable circularity in which the 
outcome, low pay, is used as the only evidence for the 
alleged cause - low skill and personal inefficiency" (ibid, 
P 35). Instead they see the explanation of low pay in the 
"social structuring of jobs and workers" and "related 
considerations of industrial and political power" (ibid, p 
37). 
Attempting to assess numbers on rates at or close to the 
minimum rate is difficult. Prior to the 1991 ECA' s 
dismantling of union recognition, comprehensive data on 
award and agreement rates were available, but now only 
partial information on contracts can be used. Certainly 
when the minimum wage's relativity is at its lowest, very 
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few jobs have wage agreements even for the lowest 
categories close to the minimum. Some low paid work, 
however, specifies the minimum wage, whatever it is at 
the time, as the minimum for that contract. In addition, 
some low paid and casualised jobs have no effective 
written contracts or agreements and for these, ·the 
minimum wage does at least provide a theoretical safety 
net. In 1998, when the CTU was seeking an increase from 
$7 to $7.50 per hour in the minimum rate, ($280 to $300 
in the weekly rate for a 40 hour week), their examination 
of contracts in low paid work found that minimum rates 
less than $300 were "distinctly outside standard labour 
market practice." 
The CTU's annual submissions seeking an increase in the 
minimum wage have regularly called for clearer 
definitions of its purpose, development of explicit criteria 
for setting it, and a formal process of consultation over 
the application of the criteria. Their 1998 submission 
suggested three reference points, firstly "the level of the 
unemployment benefit, because workers should not be 
worse off after taking waged employment", secondly 
"some stable relationship to the average wage to stop the 
low paid getting left too far behind", and thirdly "regard 
to the level of minimum rates in collective agreements so 
that the minimum wage can be a factor in eliminating 
'low pay ghettoes' from the labour market." 
It could be argued that in earlier periods there were 
clearer criteria over setting minimum wages, even if these 
were not enshrined in legislation. After 1946, while 
minimum wages were set by government, the Arbitration 
Court retained for many years the role of making General 
Wage Orders, a system which applied alongside 
collective bargaining for awards and agreement. The 
1950s and 1960s were periods of labour shortages, where 
wage increases were conceded by employers and the gaps 
between both minimum wages and negotiated award rates 
and rates actually paid widened. However, a shift to what 
the economy overall could afford was also apparent. 
Wartime regulations had been followed by the Economic 
Stabilisation Act, 1948, intended to give priority to 
economic stability and used during the 1970s to attempt 
"to effect a policy of shifting wage bargaining out of the 
sphere of industrial law and into the sphere of economic 
and monetary policy" (Williams, 1976, p 58). In practice, 
the 1970s and 1980s saw periods of very high wage/price 
inflation and an unsuccessful attempt to dam the tide with 
wage freezes. 
While seeking criteria for settling the minimum wage, the 
CTU argues that it "should not be seen as a PRIMARY 
wage fixing instrument, but rather as a 'safety net' 
protection against exploitation for those who do not have 
conditions of employment determined through a (fair) 
process of collective bargaining, and who do not have the 
personal leverage (skills etc) to secure an adequate 
employment contract" (CTU 1998 submission). In their 
view it should constitute a minimum social standard, have 
a role in tackling the problems of low pay, and be used to 
resist widening inequalities in pay - in the last of which it 
has been totally unsuccessful in recent years. That 
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minimum standard implies, in their view, that "if jobs 
will only be provided at wages below some level, society 
would rather not have them", with the need for the 
minimum to be set because "there are some people who 
for reasons of lack of knowledge or out of desperation 
will work for sub-standard wages, and others ruthless 
enough to employ them". Particularly relevant to the 
living wage discussion, it also follows for the CTU that 
"a benefit-based social standard would not represent an 
acceptable level of wages or constitute a 'minimum living 
wage"'. 
Table 1 Adult Minimum Wages (Male minimum only until1972) 
(selected years until 1981: then each increase in the minimum wage shown) 
Sources: Brosnan and Wilkinson (1987) and Labour Department publications 
Date- and political party in power Nominal and Hourly Relativity of 
Weekly (Gross $/hour) minimum wage to 
(Gross $/ 40 hour week) average weekly 
Minimum Wages earnings 
1946 0.26 
1951 0.33 
1957 0.47 
1963 0.51 
1969 National 0.59 
1972 Labour 1972/5 0.68 
1975 Nationall975/84 1.37 
1978 National 1.61 
Jan 1981 . National 2.10 
Feb 1985 Labour 1984/90 2.50 
Sep 1985 Labour 4.25 
Feb 1987 Labour 5.25 
Feb 1988 Labour 5.625 
May 1989 Labour 5.875 
September 1990 (no change 9114) 6.125 
Nationall990/9 
March' 1995 National 6.25 
March 1996 National 6.375 
March 1997 (no change 98/9) 7.00 
National 
March 2000 Labour and 7.55 
Feb 2001 Alliance Coalition 7.70 
Feb 2002 1999/2002 8.00 
Key government departments which advise Cabinet on 
the annual review of the minimum wage include 
Treasury, Labour, and the State Services Commission. 
All are regularly cautious, repeating the orthodox 
economic arguments on wage employment tradeoffs 
seemingly like automatons. Treasury goes further when 
reviewing overall economic policy, agreeing with right 
wing pressure groups including the New Zealand 
Business Roundtable that the minimum wage should be 
abolished altogether. 
The underlying philosophy is a belief that labour markets 
are perfectly competitive, with wages simply reflecting 
productivity and exploitation of employees a myth. 
Treasury is committed to only the 'wages as a price' 
view, with little or no attention to 'wages as a living', let 
alone 'wages as a social practice' (Mutari et al, 2001). 
(ordinary time): 
percentaee 
10.50 83 
13.17 67 
18.75 74 
20.33 66 
23.50 56 
23.50 44 
54.88 60 
64.41 49 
84 30 
100 34 
170 54 
210 53 
225 51 
235 50 
245 47 
(by 1994 42) 
250 43 
255 42 
280 44 
(by 1999 41) 
302 44 
308 42 
320 42 
For example: "A minimum wage has distortionary effects 
in the labour market which are likely to hinder long term 
employment prospects and harm the very workers that the 
policy is designed to assist... It is not obvious whether 
workers being paid a low wage are being exploited, or 
whether they are receiving an amount which is 
appropriate, given the training they are receiving and 
their current productivity ... (Minimum wage regulation) 
does not pass a cost/benefit test... It is likely that its 
objectives could be better achieved by other means, such 
as income assistance" (New Zealand Treasury, 1987, p 
288/290). 
Similarly, the State Services Commission (SSC), which 
has to be particularly concerned with the effects on the 
government budget of higher pay in the public sector, 
argued in 1997 that an increase in the minimum wage is 
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"inconsistent with a policy of getting disadvantaged job 
s~ekers into employment". The Labour Market Policy 
Group of the Department of Labour (LMPG) regularly 
predicts adverse employment effects in response to 
minimum wage increases. 
In contrast with these three departments, the Ministry of 
Women's Affairs valiantly fights rearguard actions 
supporting an increase. Their comments on drafts of 
official papers to go to Cabinet on the 1998 and 1999 
Minimum Wage Reviews question conventional wisdom, 
arguing that some studies show that appropriately set 
minimum wages can raise productivity levels and 
economic efficiency. On the issue of possible 
exploitation, the Ministry argued on 27 October 1998: 
"The issue of vulnerable workers who need protection 
from exploitation relates not only to those who lack the 
necessary information and skills to bargain effectively but 
also to workers who lack bargaining power, for whatever 
reason. The protection of vulnerable workers is not only a 
question about whether monopsonies are present in the 
labour market, it is also a question about the ability of the 
industrial relations structure to protect workers from 
discrimination and exploitation. It is by no means certain 
that workers will receive wages equivalent to their 
productivity in any market where there is significant 
unemployment and employers are legally available to 
exploit this situation." 
The following year they expressed concern over a 
concentration on economic impacts of minimum wages at 
the expense of social impacts. "The paper contains 
extensive discussion of the employment effects of an 
increase, even thought they may be statistically 
insignificant... Yet conversely there is no discussion of 
the social impacts ... in particular, of what it means to live 
on the minimum wage and the flow-on effects for other 
areas of social policy" (MWA to LMPG, 6.10.1999). The 
Ministry argued for considering the complementary 
nature of minimum wages and in-work tax credits. Their 
own recommendation in 1999 was for an increase in the 
minimum wage to $8 per hour (which it has now just 
reached in 2002), arguing that "the minimum wage is a 
direct means of improving income adequacy for 
individuals in low wage work, amongst whom women 
and Maori are disproportionately represented" (MW A to 
LMPG, 3.11.1999), with about 57/58% of those directly 
benefiting being women. 
Given the vehemence of Treasury arguments, it might be 
expected that empirical evidence on the impacts of the 
minimum wage is stronger than elsewhere, with negative 
employment effects of increases clearly established. In 
fact this is far from the case, with the same theoretical 
arguments used by both sides on the issue as in overseas 
countries, but with even less sound empirical econometric 
evidence controlling for other factors. The most quoted 
article (Maloney, 1995) does find negative employment 
effects for young adults, but has been subjected to 
methodological criticism, while Chapple ( 1997) found 
mostly insignificant results. A later study of females with 
no qualifications, a 'high risk' group, found "little 
evidence that the increases in the adult minimum wage 
diminish their employment prospects" (Pacheco and 
Maloney, 1999, p 67). The CTU was concerned about the 
objectivity of the studies and their interpretation, pointing 
out in their 1998 submissions that some of Maloney's 
work had been commissioned by the NZ Business 
Roundtable and questioning their selective quoting in the 
Officials Paper on the1997 review. 
All these studies referred to difficulties with data, 
including lack of a sufficiently long time series. Pacheco 
and Moloney, faced with findings apparently failing to 
conform to orthodox theory, suggest interpretations of 
their results to rescue it. "Politicians might opt to raise the 
minimum wage when general economic conditions 
suggest that any adverse effects will be minimal" (ibid, p 
67). This could be plausible but for the fact that the ratio 
of the minimum to average wage has fluctuated very 
widely with Labour governments raising them more often 
and by greater amounts than National administrations, 
whatever the economic situation. 
As well as the minimum wage, the minimum code in New 
Zealand enshrines a number of provisions which can be 
improved on in contracts but not eroded. These include 
annual leave, statutory holidays,- sick leave and parental 
leave, the latter partly if minimally paid leave since July 
2002, again thanks largely to the efforts of the Alliance 
junior partner in government. The Equal Pay Act 1972 
and the employment related anti discrimination 
provisions of the Human Rights legislation are also 
sometimes classified under the minimum code. 
The Social Wage 
The New Zealand social welfare system's supplementary 
targetted assistance to low income earners forming part of 
the social wage includes support for bringing up children, 
Accommodation Benefit and the Community Services 
Card. In 1986 a Guaranteed Minimum Family Income 
(GMFI) was introduced, now converted into a family tax 
credit. This tops up the income of two parent households 
where either parent or both in combination are in paid 
work for 30 hrs or more per week and combined income 
is very low. Sole parents not on DPB and in the labour 
force for 20 hours or more per week are also eligible, 
while targetted Family Support is available to all those 
caring for dependent children. 
In 1987, when the minimum wage level for a 40 hour 
week was raised to $210, GMFI for a household with one 
child, including Family Support, was only $270. Since 
those on the minimum wage would also qualify for 
family support, then $42 per week for the first child, 
families where one parent was workinng a 40 hour week 
would receive only a minimal GMFI payment. Combined 
with little publicity for the benefit, no indexation, and an 
effective 100% marginal tax rate, take up of GMFI was 
very low. As a family tax credit, it now tops up the 
income of families who meet the conditions above and 
have an income below $352.23 per week before tax to 
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that level (before adding Family Support). With the 
minimum wage for a 40 hours week now $320, again the 
gap is fairly small but benefits some low income families. 
Family Support to be added is now $47 per week for the 
first child and $32 per week for subsequent children 
under 13 years old, with extra amounts for older children. 
The increase of $5 for the first child over 15 years is 
derisory compared with the rate of inflation while income 
threshholds for targetting have also failed to keep pace 
with price increases. The abatement regime means that . 
one child families on the average wage receive no child 
support at all (St John, 2002). 
In addition to Family Support, in 1996 a previous tax 
credit to support children was converted into a new Child 
Tax Credit at a maximum of $15.00 a week per child. 
This new 'incentive' for working parents only was 
severely criticised by poverty activists for penalising 
beneficiary families, but does help the low paid working 
group under consideration here. Child care is also 
subsidised by tax financed payments to approved child 
care centres. The Accident Compensation Scheme is the 
only element of the system based on social insurance, 
with contributions from employers and employees 
towards workplace accidents costs. This scheme provides 
80% replacement of wages following an accident and 
meets other costs. 
Also regarded under some definitions as part of the social 
wage is government expenditure on education and health 
directed towards wage earners. The scope and magnitude 
of government subsidised elements of living costs is 
much greater than in the United States, where health 
insurance coverage by employers is therefore a crucial 
benefit. This difference may well be part of the 
explanation for a living wage being a major campaign 
issue in many U.S. cities, unlike the situation in New 
Zealand. 
Labour Market Deregulation and Widening 
Differentials 
The reduced collective employee power following from 
labour market deregulation in the 1990s limited the 
labour movement's ability to fight for the low paid. One 
U.S. based observer judged the changes to the New 
Zealand industrial scene as "visible and dramatic, 
because in an astoundingly short time it moved from 
being a socialized country with labor law that was highly 
protective of unions and with one of the highest levels of 
union density in the world to a country that was 
extremely hospitable to free market ideas with a labor law 
founded on Chicago school ideas" (Dannin, 2001, p 
1091). The provisions of the Employment Contracts Act 
1991, together with a weak economy, inevitably led to a 
rapid fall in tinion coverage, from the internationally high 
level of 55.7% of wage and salary earners in 1989 to 
21.4% in 1999 (May et al, 2001). Simultaneously there 
was a sharp reduction in collective, and especially multi 
employer bargaining. 
The Labour/ Alliance government 1999/2002 repealed the 
ECA, and its Employment Relations Act, 2000 (ERA) 
went some way to restoring union recognition and rights. 
Membership has recovered somewhat, with a 9% increase 
over the two years to December 200 1, as against an 
increase in employment of 4.3%. However, some see the 
ERA changes as being largely a matter of details rather 
than fundamental aspects of industrial law (Dannin, 
2001). 
With the decimation of unions in the 1990s, the priority 
for individual unions was survival for themselves and 
their members, by making their services attractive to 
current and potential members in a new situation. The 
legislative framework was much more favourable than 
before to competition between unions in a workplace 
rather than allowing a largely captive membership, while 
the curtailment of union rights and power made it more · 
difficult to persuade many workers of the need to join any 
union. In this climate, individual unions needed to 
concentrate on retaining reasonable collective contracts; 
being forced to bargain in most cases employer by 
employer. The NZ Council of Trade Unions (CTU) was 
also weakened by deunionisation. 
In the individualistic climate of_ the 1990s, with 
government antipathy to collectivism and trade union 
power, the area where progress looked most possible was 
on individual rights. To soften the ECA measures, 
National Minister of Labour Bill Birch, in a media 
statement (23.4.1991) promised to strengthen the 
minimum code as a 'safety-net' for employees. However, 
all that this produced was a new statutory entitlement to 5 
days paid leave per year for sickness or bereavement. In 
this climate one focus for the CTU was enhancement of 
the minimum code and conditions of work, a focus still 
maintained. Thus the 2001 Fairness at Work campaign of 
the CTU had as its main themes occupational safety and 
health, improvements to accident compensation, paid 
' parental leave, equal employment opportunity, abolishing 
youth rates under the minimum wage, and improvements 
to holiday provisions, together with a work-family 
balance campaign. While the notion of a living wage 
might have formed part of an individual rights based 
approach, wage levels beyond the minimum were largely 
left to individual unions. 
In New Zealand as in most other countries, the costs of 
structural adjustment programmes have fallen largely on 
low income groups. In addition real average earnings 
levels stagnated until recently (Martin, 1997). Recent 
studies of income distribution all show widening gaps 
both with respect to earnings and total household incomes 
(Podder and Chaterjee, 1998). Differentials have been 
widening throughout the capitalist world. The 
neoclassical rationale is that of required higher returns to 
, scarce skills, with top salaries reflecting high 
productivity, responsibility, and performance in an 
increasingly complex and technologically advanced 
environment with international competition for these 
skills. The differentials are now, this position argues, , 
closer than in earlier years to where they should be, as 
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However, the. literature contains plenty of scepticism 
about simple explanations focussed on justified increased 
returns to skills and education (discussed further in 
Hyman, 1999). One review suggests that the rise of U.S. 
wage inequality is substantially due to institutional 
forces, with declines in the real value of the minimum 
wage and the level of unionisation significant factors 
(Fortin and Lemieux, 1997). Robert Kuttner challenges 
the market's verdicts on worth, pointing to "the sheer 
randomness of pay arrangements in a market society, the 
_ benefits of discrimination to dominant groups, and the 
loose connection between the distribution of earnings and 
the economic performance of society as a whole" 
(Kuttner, 1997, p 76). Hence, noting the fall in value of 
the U.S. minimum wage from 50% to under 40% of the 
average, "the widening of earnings inequality is less the 
result of natural changes in the distribution of skills or the 
logic of labor markets than a reflection of shifts in 
relative power between owner of capital and wage and 
salary workers" (ibid, p 85). 
Why No Concerted Movement For A Living 
Wage? 
Strategies based on a living wage slogan might seem 
sensible during a period of increasing inequality and high 
poverty levels for low income families and children. 
Certainly the need for very low waged sectors of the 
economy and high levels of inequality need to be 
questioned. However, a number of factors together may 
account for the lack of active campaigning on the living 
wage issue or slogan, despite it being in the background. 
These include reduced union power and the need to 
prioritise and, compared to the U.S. situation, the 
comparative strength of the minimum code and social 
wage, discussed above. In the U.S. the minimum wage 
has become increasingly weak, failing even to keep up 
with inflation. Also contributing to the difference in 
tactics is the relative size and differences in government 
structures. 
Another element in the lack of attention in New Zealand 
to a living wage is a lack of discussion, analysis, and 
alternative perspectives to the orthodox in the media and 
public discourse over low pay and widening differentials. 
Certainly, the packages and redundancy or other payouts 
to CEOs, politicians and public servants receive attention 
and critique. But negative reactions to very high 
executive pay are often labelled the politics of envy, with 
international competition cited as one element in their 
being essential. Overall, orthodoxy appears to have 
captured most of the high ground. One contribution to 
this may be the lack of open fora for debate. Minimum 
wages are set by government following submissions by 
the major stakeholders. There are no longer General 
Wage Orders or an Arbitration Court holding open 
hearings. Select Committees debate many issues but not 
in this arena. Privacy of wage information is the norm in 
an era of individual contracts. Low pay is often seen as 
inevitable in a relatively poor performing economy with 
higher growth rates and 'trickle down' the only possible 
remedies. 
The changes discussed in this paper have led to a 
situation where collective action by the low paid occurs 
less than industrial action by professional groups, 
particularly in the education and health sectors. While 
these groups may have strong cases for improved 
earnings, they are not the lowest paid towards whom 
minimum or living wages campaigns are directed. Much 
less industrial power is in the hands of the really low paid 
and undervalued female dominated groups in the health 
sector. As the Minister of Women's Affairs put it on 
Suffrage Day 2002 with respect to home care workers: "It 
is a triple wharnmy where workers are undervalued 
because they are primarily women, the type of work they 
do is undervalued, and the older people and people with 
disabilities they care for also undervalued." Equal pay for 
work of equal value or pay equity is once more on the 
political agenda, challenging orthodox explanations of 
gender earning differences. However, the enterprise 
bargaining dominated industrial relations system makes it 
even harder to devise a W()rkable system than in 1990 
when the shortlived Employment Equity Act attempted to 
tackle the issue. If a politically acceptable system can be 
devised, it could be one way for home care workers and 
other low paid female groups to achieve equity and a 
living wage. Similar arguments apply to Maori and 
Pacific Island dominated low paid work. 
One potential difficulty with the living wage relates to the 
level and relationship to family structure. In the U.S. "the 
living wage typically advocated is the -hourly rate 
equivalent to keeping a family of four above the federal 
poverty line" (Figart, 1999). This is essentially the family 
wage revisited. The gender bias issue in the family wage 
is hopefully outdated, but this is partly reflected in the 
increasing proportion of two earner families, which 
makes seeking a living or family wage for each 
problematic in terms of the old arguments. Some CTU 
comments for the 1999 minimum wage review are 
relevant here. "It should be noted the minimum wage is 
not a 'living wage'. A living wage comes from a mix of 
wages, income support for dependent children, costs of 
housing and the rest: it is a mix of the industrial and 
social wage. A minimum wage can never be set at a 
living wage level because the number of people 
depending on it, and the other living costs that they face 
are not settled. For example, if a minimum wage was set 
at a level that allowed a wage earner to support an adult 
couple and three dependent children, it would massively 
'overcompensate' a sirigle young adult, but not provide a 
living wage for a wage earner with four dependent 
children." 
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Conclusion 
The issues over whether adequacy of wages for living 
should be the business of employers or government/the 
community or both (or whether it is only a concern for 
the employee) will continue to be important in New 
Zealand. The extent to which the social welfare system, 
the employer or neither should be ·responsible for 
adequate living standards is bound to remain contentious. 
The relative role of minimum/living wages and of social 
welfare benefits/top ups in preventing poverty has been 
alluded to above by the Ministry of Women's Affairs. 
Are social welfare top ups at times simply subsidising 
employers and reducing the pressure on them to pay 
adequate wages? And what of their disincentive effects 
on both employers and employees to increase wages by 
raising hours or productivity, training and skills, 
especially when subject to 100% withdrawal? Overall, a 
sensible conclusion is that: "Minimum wages and social 
welfare are not alternatives but essential complements" 
(Brosnan and Wilkinson, 1987, p 38). Social justice 
campaigners will no doubt continue to debate the best 
combination of employer and government support for 
those on low wages, as well as support for those unable 
to find employment. A realistic minimum wage will 
continue to be part of the latter approach - whether the 
living wage will reemerge remains to be seen. 
Future Research 
There is a need for much more information and debate 
than occurs in New Zealand on the principles and 
practices that underlie wage determination. There is little 
literature parallel to that in the United States on wages as 
a living and as a social practice, not just wages as a price 
(Mutari et al, 200 I), with only a few writers in academic 
or public debate (Hazeldine, 1998: Hyman, 1998) looking 
behind or beyond orthodox accounts of wage structures. 
More information and debate is needed on earnings, with 
a retreat from excessive secrecy/privacy towards public 
disclosure. At the low wage end of the market, minimum 
wage debates need to be more in the open. ' The 
contribution to this of Harre (2002) was an important 
precedent, but with Alliance out of government and 
Parliament, others must ensure that its impact is not lost. 
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